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RIGHT DECISION, WRONG CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: TAKING THE BETTER PATH WITH EQUAL
PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE—LAWRENCE V.
TEXAS, 123 S. CT. 2472 (2003)
H. John Proud*

I. INTRODUCTION
When John Lawrence invited an adult male friend to his Houston,
Texas apartment he could not have guessed that their consensual decision to
have sex would attach his name forever to a U.S. Supreme Court decision,
resulting in a new direction for interpreting the U.S. Constitution.1
Our country has often struggled with the inherent constitutional tension
associated with efforts by the majority of society to impose its moral values
on the rest of society by criminalizing certain types of private sexual
activity.2 While all laws are essentially based on fundamental morality,3
when does the law’s strict adherence to a relatively widespread moral belief
become an intolerable restriction on the personal and private rights of those
who do not share that belief? In deciding John Lawrence’s case, the
Supreme Court dramatically changed its answer to that question.
In its landmark decision in Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court
properly held that all consenting adults, whether heterosexual or
homosexual, enjoy the same level of personal freedom in the privacy of
their own bedrooms.4 The process the Court employed in reaching its
conclusion, however, was unnecessarily overreaching.
The Supreme Court majority based its decision in Lawrence on the Due
*
Staff Writer, 2003-04, University of Dayton Law Review. J. D. expected May 2004, University of
Dayton School of Law; B.A., 1970, University of Dayton. The author would like to thank his wife
Debbie and his sons for their encouragement and support throughout law school, his Executive Editor
for Notes & Comments Tara-Ann Topputo for her help and dedication to excellence, and Editor-inChief Dale Riedel for his encouragement to join the Law Review.
1

Lawrence v. Tex., 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).

2

See e.g. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992). In reaffirming but
also limiting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Supreme Court majority noted that in the nineteen
years that followed the Roe decision, the United States, acting as amicus curiae, joined no less than five
suits before the Court seeking a reversal of its holding. Id.
3
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569
(1991) (stating “[t]he traditional police power of the States is defined as the authority to provide for the
public health, safety, and morals, and we have upheld such a basis for legislation.”); Lawrence v. State,
41 S.W.3d 349, 354 (Tex. Crim. App. 14th Dist. 2001) (“In fact, the legislature has outlawed behavior
ranging from murder to prostitution precisely because it has deemed these activities to be immoral. Even
our civil law rests on concepts of fairness derived from a moral understanding of right and wrong.”).
4
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Process Clause5 and, due to an individual’s fundamental right to privacy,
held that the government has no right to impose any legislation to regulate
what consenting adults do in the privacy of their bedrooms.6 In the
Lawrence ruling, the Court expressly overturned its earlier holding in
Bowers v. Hardwick,7 which held that a sovereign state does have the
inherent constitutional authority to determine legal behavior based on the
moral beliefs of the majority of its citizens, as represented by the state’s
legislature.8 The Court employed rather expansive language to ensure that
after Lawrence a legislature may not enact laws that ban sodomy, an
integral part of male homosexual sex, or presumably any other mode of
sexual expression when performed in private by consenting adults.9 While
John Lawrence’s appeal also raised equal protection arguments, the Court
expressly chose the due process argument to preemptively ensure that
legislatures could not impose their collective morality on the populace by
banning certain private sexual acts equally for both same-sex and oppositesex participants.10
This Note argues that Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion, based on
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause,11 should have been
the basis for the majority decision. Section II of this Note examines the
background of Lawrence v. Texas, providing a factual and procedural
summary of the case and a brief analysis of the majority and concurring
opinions. Section III presents the reasons why the Supreme Court majority
should have based its holding on the Equal Protection Clause, and the
benefits that would have resulted if it had. Section IV concludes with a
prediction of a plethora of challenges to longstanding legal principles that
will result from the majority decision.

5

U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. (stating “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . .”).
6

Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2477.

7

Id. at 2484.

8

Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.

9

Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.

10

Id. at 2487-88 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

11

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating “nor shall any state . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”).
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II. BACKGROUND

A. The Facts and Procedural History of Lawrence
Lawrence v. Texas began one Houston night in 1998 when police
officers were dispatched to the private residence of John Lawrence
(“Lawrence”) in response to a purported weapons disturbance.12 They
entered Lawrence’s apartment and proceeded to his bedroom where they
observed him engaged in a consensual sex act with another adult man,
Tyron Garner (“Garner”).13 The police arrested and charged Lawrence and
Garner with “deviate sexual intercourse, namely anal sex.”14 Under Texas
law, in effect at that time, homosexual sodomy was a criminal offense.15
Specifically, Texas law stated “[a] person commits an offense if he engages
in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.”16
The statute includes a definition of “deviate sexual intercourse” as “(A) any
contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or
anus of another person; or (B) the penetration of the genitals or the anus of
another person with an object.”17
Lawrence was convicted in the Justice of the Peace Court and promptly
filed an appeal for a trial de novo in the Harris County Court of Common
Pleas.18 In his pre-trial motions, Lawrence challenged the law as a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and a
violation of a similar provision in the Texas Constitution, but his motions
were denied.19 Thereafter, he entered a no contest plea, was found guilty of
the charge, and was fined $200.20 Lawrence filed an appeal with the Texas
Criminal Appellate Court, where a panel of judges heard his appeal.21 He

12

123 S. Ct. at 2475; Br. of Petr. at 2, Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472; available at 2002 U.S. Briefs 102
(stating that the report of a weapons discharge was false).
13

Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475.

14

Id. at 2476.
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.06(a) (2003). Homosexual sodomy was a Class C Misdemeanor. Id. at

15

§ 21.06(b). At the time of this writing, the Texas Legislature has not yet officially removed or modified
the statute to reflect the Court’s decision in Lawrence.
16

Id. at § 21.06(a).

17

Id. From the text of the statute it is clear that sodomy was only a crime in Texas if it was engaged
in by homosexual couples and was not a crime if engaged in by heterosexual partners.

Published by eCommons, 2003
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Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2476.

19

Id.

20

Id.

21

Br. of Petr. at 3, Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472.
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based his appeal on his original equal protection argument and added a
second argument based on the Due Process Clause.22 The appellate court
panel held that the Texas statute violated the Texas Constitution’s Equal
Protection Clause and reversed the lower court’s decision.23 The Texas
Criminal Appellate Court, however, then agreed to a rehearing en banc,
after which it denied both constitutional arguments, reversed the three judge
panel’s decision, and reaffirmed Lawrence’s conviction.24
The en banc Texas Criminal Appellate Court held that the anti-sodomy
statute did not violate either the Texas or the U.S. Constitutions’ Equal
Protection Clauses because “there is no fundamental right to engage in
homosexual sodomy, homosexuals do not constitute a suspect class and, the
prohibition of homosexual conduct advances a legitimate state interest and
is rationally related . . . to preserving public morals.”25 The en banc
appellate court’s majority opinion indicated reliance on Bowers v.
Hardwick as a controlling precedent in denying Lawrence’s due process
argument.26 In Bowers, the Supreme Court upheld a facially neutral Georgia
statute that prohibited sodomy regardless of whether the participants were
same-sex or opposite-sex couples.27 Lawrence appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court, which granted certiorari, heard the case, and rendered its
decision in July 2003.28
B. The Supreme Court’s Holding in Lawrence
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, authored an expansive ruling
that focused almost exclusively on the due process argument, overturned
Bowers v. Hardwick, and held the Texas anti-sodomy statute
unconstitutional.29 The majority decision advanced two primary ideas. First,
the Court held that in matters pertaining to sex, regardless of the moral
beliefs of the majority, a state may not proscribe certain conduct as illegal
due to the level of personal liberty and privacy that consenting adults hold
in a private residence. In making its ruling, the Court reaffirmed the Due
Process Clause guarantee of a person’s fundamental right of privacy.30 As

22

Id.

23

Id. at 4.

24

Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2476.

25

Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 357.

26

Id. at 354.

27

Bowers, 478 U.S. 186.

28

Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472.

29

Id. at 2475, 2484.

30

Id. at 2483-84.
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an integral part of its decision, the Supreme Court overruled its prior
inapposite holding in Bowers.31 Second, the Court observed, in dicta, that
the Texas statute was likely unconstitutional under an Equal Protection
Clause argument. However, the Court elected to use the Due Process Clause
to proactively prohibit a state from enacting laws about sexual practices
which are based on the moral beliefs of the majority and applied equally to
all its citizens.32
C. Justice O’Connor’s Concurrence in Lawrence, Based On Equal
Protection
Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment finding Texas’s statute
banning same-sex sodomy unconstitutional. However, she based her
opinion on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause33 and
refrained from joining the majority in overruling Bowers.34 Justice
O’Connor’s opinion states that given the specific facts of Lawrence, equal
protection was the appropriate body of law to be used in determining the
constitutionality of Texas’s anti-sodomy law.35 She further stated that
“moral disapproval [by the majority is not] a legitimate state interest to
justify by itself a statute that bans homosexual sodomy, but not
heterosexual sodomy”36 and, therefore, the Texas statute fails to “satisfy
rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause.”37 She noted that
homosexuals are a class of individuals specifically targeted by the statute38
and “a state cannot single out one identifiable class of citizens for
punishment that does not apply to everyone else.”39 Justice O’Connor added
that the due process question of whether a state can enact an anti-sodomy
law that applies equally to consenting homosexuals and heterosexuals was
not at issue in the Lawrence case and, therefore, was not before the Court.40

Published by eCommons, 2003

31

Id. at 2484; see supra n. 27 and accompanying text.

32

Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.

33

Id. at 2484 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

34

Id.

35

See generally id. at 2484.

36

Id. at 2486.

37

Id.

38

Id. at 2487.

39

Id.

40

Id.
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III. ARGUMENT
The Supreme Court had a major choice to make and it made the wrong
one. Faced with the task of evaluating the constitutionality of Texas’s antisodomy law, the Court surely must have discussed several essential
questions. First, should the decision be limited to the specific facts of
Lawrence or should an expansive opinion be written that makes new law?
Second, should the Court follow the principles of stare decisis or side-step
them? Third, should the Court exercise judicial restraint so as not to
encroach on the role of the Congress, nor put into question numerous other
long standing and settled state laws based on the moral beliefs of the
majority? At each possible decision point, the Court’s majority chose the
wrong direction, leading them to base their decision in Lawrence on the
Due Process Clause, when a decision based on the Equal Protection Clause
was the more appropriate and sound direction.
A. The Specific Facts of Lawrence Require a Decision Based on Equal
Protection
The Supreme Court is “bound by two rules, to which it has rigidly
adhered, one, never to anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance
of the necessity of deciding it; the other never to formulate a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is
to be applied.”41
A review of the specific facts of Lawrence directly gives rise to an
equal protection analysis in an adjudication of the case. Lawrence and
Garner were arrested and convicted under a state law that only applies to a
minority segment of the state’s population.42 The Texas statute clearly
permits sodomy between married or unmarried heterosexuals, while
criminalizing it only when it is engaged in by same-sex couples.43 It is
facially discriminatory under the Equal Protection Clause because it focuses
exclusively on a minority class of the population and may only be
constitutional if it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.44
Lawrence’s motions in the common pleas court and in his original appeal
41
Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Commrs. of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885); see also Lisa
Kloppenberg, Measured Constitutional Steps, 71 Ind. L.J. 297, 298 (1996); U.S. v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17,
21 (1960); Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 330 (1991).
42
See supra nn. 15-17 (describing Texas’s Penal Code, which criminalized sodomy only when
practiced by same-sex partners).
43

Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 353.

44

Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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argued that Texas’s statute violated the Equal Protection Clause and
violated his fundamental right to privacy under the Due Process Clause.45
The first appellate court decision in his favor agreed with his contention
that the statute violated his equal protection rights and held the statute
unconstitutional.46
As Justice O’Connor held in her concurring Supreme Court opinion,
under the facts of Lawrence, Texas does not have a legitimate state interest
in support of its facially discriminatory anti-sodomy statute and, therefore,
the statute is unconstitutional.47 In her opinion, Lawrence should have been
decided using the Equal Protection Clause, therefore, leaving the Court
with no legitimate need to consider the case under the broader Due Process
Clause.48 Even the majority acknowledged that declaring the Texas statute
invalid under the Equal Protection Clause is a tenable argument.49
The Supreme Court would have achieved a better result if it had
followed its own judicial rule to limit its decision to the facts of the case
before it. It would have resolved Lawrence’s issue in his favor while
advancing important equal protection jurisprudence. By adhering to its own
policy of judicial behavior, it would have provided an excellent example of
judicial restraint for lower federal courts to stick to the facts of the case
before them. Finally, it would have bolstered the legitimacy of an
independent judiciary by insulating it from charges of inappropriate
political activism.
B. A Decision Based on Equal Protection Preserves the Principle of Stare
Decisis, Finds the Texas Statute Unconstitutional, and Neutralizes
Bowers by Reinterpreting it on that Basis
Had the Supreme Court decided Lawrence under equal protection
jurisprudence, it would have followed stare decisis, an important rule of
judicial interpretation and decision-making. Had the Court done so, it
would still have found the Texas anti-sodomy statute unconstitutional and
would have had the opportunity to reconsider and narrowly reverse its
decision in Bowers.
1. A Decision Based on Equal Protection Follows the Principle of Stare
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45

Id. at 2476; Br. of Petr. at 4, Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472.

46

Br. of Petr. at 4, Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472.

47

Lawrence, 123 U.S. at 2487-88 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

48

Id. at 2487.

49

Id. at 2482.
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Decisis
The principle of stare decisis is the obligation for courts to make
current decisions consistent with prior ones.50 While stare decisis “is not an
inexorable command,”51 it should be followed wherever possible and
prudent.52 The principle of stare decisis grew out of necessity.53 As Justice
O’Connor wrote in Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, a judicial
system could not possibly do society’s work if it freshly decided every case
without any reference to prior decisions.54 Stare decisis, therefore,
transcends beyond mere judicial efficiency as it also keeps a promise of
faith with the people who expect constancy in judicial matters.55 Justice
O’Connor warns that the Court should bypass stare decisis only when “the
most convincing justification . . . could suffice to demonstrate that a later
decision overruling the first was anything but a surrender to political
pressure and an unjustified repudiation of the principle on which the Court
staked its authority in the first instance.”56 To unnecessarily overrule a prior
decision would put into question the Court’s fundamental legitimacy.57
Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in Casey also lists a set of prudent and
pragmatic “considerations” to be used when deciding whether to bypass
stare decisis and overrule a prior decision.58 Her list includes a
determination of:
1) whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying
practical workability; 2) whether the rule is subject to a kind of
reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of
overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; 3) whether
related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the
old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine; or 4)
whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as

50

Casey, 505 U.S. at 854.

51

Id. (citing Payne v. Tenn., 501 U.S. 808, 842 (1991)). Writing for the Casey majority, Justice
O’Connor reinforced the importance of following the principle of stare decisis and outlined factors that a
reviewing court should use to assess a set of current facts, coupled with social and legal developments
that have occurred since a prior case was decided, to balance whether or not it is still appropriate to
follow the decision made in the prior case.
52

See generally Casey, 505 U.S. at 855. See infra nn. 58-59 and accompanying text for criteria.

53

Casey, 505 U.S. at 854.

54

Id.

55

Id. at 868.

56

Id. at 867.

57

Id.

58

Id. at 855.
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to have robbed the old rule of significant application or
justification.59
Since the Court’s decision in Lawrence could have and should have
been decided exclusively on an equal protection basis, it was unnecessary
for the Court to violate the principle of stare decisis by broadly overturning
its decision in Bowers. This Note has little quarrel with the Court’s
determination that there are numerous problems with its decision in Bowers.
In fact, as described later in this Note, Bowers should be narrowly
reinterpreted and reconsidered on an equal protection basis to alter the
Court’s decision. However, the broad manner in which the Court
overturned Bowers was unnecessarily expansive and ignored Justice
O’Connor’s second stare decisis consideration: whether there had been
“reliance” on a prior decided point of law.
The majority opinion in Bowers advanced the principle that state
legislatures, fulfilling their constitutional role, have the duty and right to
develop laws based on common and fundamental morality, as understood
by the majorities they represent.60 State legislatures have relied on this
principle since the founding of the republic and have enacted countless state
laws based on fundamental and common morality that are rationally related
to a legitimate state interest.61
The Court in Lawrence, adopting language offered by Justice Stevens
in his dissenting opinion in Bowers, states “the fact that the governing
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral
is not sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”62
Almost as an afterthought, the Court then adds that its decision in Lawrence
does not rule on numerous other activities related to sexual conduct
practiced by consenting adults in privacy.63 As the dissent correctly points
out, however, the unnecessarily expansive language used by the majority
puts into question countless state laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage,
adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and
obscenity.64
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia warns that the majority’s failure
to follow stare decisis as evidenced by its broad reversal of Bowers will
lead to “a massive disruption of the current social order.”65 The national
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59

Id. at 854-55 (internal citations omitted and enumerations added).

60

See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194-96.

61

Id. at 196.

62

Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483.

63

Id. at 2484.

64

Id. at 2490 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & Thomas, J., dissenting).

65

Id. at 2491.
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reliance on the underlying principle of Bowers, that state legislatures do
have the constitutional right to enact laws based on morality that pass
rational basis scrutiny, is an adequate reason to follow stare decisis and not
broadly overturn it.66 In its zeal to overturn Bowers, the Court does not
adequately consider all of its options and goes farther than necessary in its
decision.
The Court had two viable options to decide Lawrence that would not
have violated stare decisis. First, it could have followed Justice O’Connor’s
lead and decided Lawrence under equal protection jurisprudence based
solely on its facts, and without attempting to reinterpret or overrule
Bowers.67 Second, the Court could have reinterpreted or overruled Bowers
narrowly on equal protection grounds, because Georgia selectively and
unconstitutionally applied its facially neutral law exclusively against
homosexuals. Upon overruling Bowers, the Court could then have decided
Lawrence on equal protection grounds, because the non-neutral Texas law
was authored exclusively for and selectively applied against homosexuals.
Given these two viable options to decide Lawrence on equal protection
grounds without violating the principle of stare decisis, the Court
incorrectly and unfortunately chose the due process path and doomed stare
decisis to a mere afterthought. It was an unnecessary step which could lead
to countless lawsuits intended to reaffirm the role of the legislature in
making law and reaffirm a state’s constitutional authority to enact laws
based on morality that are rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
2. The Equal Protection Clause Renders Texas’s Anti-Sodomy Statute
Unconstitutional
“The universal application of law to all citizens has been a tenet of
English common law since at least the Magna Carta, and our whole system
of law is predicated on this fundamental principle.”68 The Equal Protection
Clause’s inherent aspiration requires that all people, regardless of station,
circumstances, or conditions, must be treated alike under the law, receiving
equal privileges and liabilities.69 Under the Equal Protection Clause, a law
66

Id. at 2490.

67

Id. at 2484 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

68

Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 351 (citing Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332 (1921)); see also
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972) (noting “[t]he framers of the Constitution knew, and we
should not forget today, that there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and
unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a
minority must be imposed generally”). Eisenstadt is cited in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, Justice
O’Connor’s concurring opinion, and Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion.
69

Truax, 257 U.S. at 333.
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is unconstitutional if it provides advantages or privileges, to either
individuals or classes, on one hand, and hostility, discrimination, or
oppression on the other.70 The practical reality of legislation, however, is
that most laws classify people for one purpose or another, which results in
some disadvantage to various groups.71 Consequently, the Court has also
held that it will uphold a law that neither burdens a fundamental right nor
targets a suspect class so long as the legislative classification bears a
rational relation to some independent and legitimate legislative end.72
Texas’s anti-sodomy statute is unconstitutional under two theories of
equal protection jurisprudence. First, under Romer v. Evans, a statute is
unconstitutional if it is inherently “born of animosity toward the class of
persons affected” because the “desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”73 Second, as
established in Eisenstadt v. Baird, under the Equal Protection Clause there
is no rational legislative interest for a state to criminalize sexual activities
when performed by consenting unmarried adults, which are legal when
practiced by married couples.74 The Texas anti-sodomy statute violates both
equal protection theories and is therefore unconstitutional.
a. Texas’s Anti-Sodomy Statute is Born of Animosity Toward the Class
of Persons Affected
If a statute is “born of animosity toward the class of persons affected,”
then the inherent desire within it to “harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest,” and therefore, it is
unconstitutional.75 In 1973, the Texas legislature changed its anti-sodomy

70

Id.

71

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). Romer is cited in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion,
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion, and Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion.
72

Id.

73

Id. at 634 (emphasis in original). When Colorado municipalities passed local ordinances barring
discrimination based on sexual orientation, a statewide referendum was passed by Colorado voters
precluding any legislative, judicial, or executive action designed to protect the rights of individuals
based on homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual status. Id. at 623. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed a
trial court’s holding that the subject amendment did not pass strict scrutiny and was unconstitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1282 (Colo. 1993). The U.S.
Supreme Court affirmed the Colorado Supreme Court holding that Colorado’s amendment violated
equal protection because it singled out homosexuals to deny them safeguards to act in ways that others
enjoy or may seek without constraint. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635-36. Also, the amendment was surely born
out of animosity to the class of individuals that it affected and such animus cannot be a legitimate state
interest. Id. at 634.

Published by eCommons, 2003

74

405 U.S. at 454.
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Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (emphasis in original).
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law from one that banned sodomy, regardless of the status of the
participants, to one that only banned sodomy when practiced by same-sex
partners.76 The Texas legislature recognized that under emerging due
process jurisprudence it could no longer dictate what married couples did in
private.77 However, in changing its anti-sodomy law, Texas had a choice to
repeal it for everyone, but chose to retain it only for same-sex partners.78
There can be no rational reason for the Texas legislature to have taken this
approach except to apply the law discriminately against homosexual
couples as a minority class. Also, there can be no rational reason for this
action other than a negative animus against homosexuals and homosexual
conduct. Therefore, the Texas anti-sodomy statute cannot pass rational
review under equal protection jurisprudence. It is facially written and
applied only to same-sex partners, banning conduct that is inherent to the
essence of being a homosexual, and there is legislative history to establish
that it was retained due to an animus towards homosexuals as a minority
class.79
b. Consensual Sodomy is Legal for Married Heterosexual Couples Under
Texas Law and Must also be Legal When Practiced by Unmarried
Couples, Based on Equal Protection
In Eisenstadt, the Court established the legal principle that rules cannot
be facially written for or applied differently to married and single people.80
Eisenstadt involved laws that allowed married people to use contraceptives
but banned their use by single people.81 It followed an earlier case,
Griswold v. Connecticut, where the Supreme Court employed the Due
Process Clause ruling that privacy is a fundamental right and establishing
that the state has no legitimacy in dictating what married people choose to
do concerning things so private as the choice to have children or not.82 In
Eisenstadt, the Court held that under the Equal Protection Clause,
unmarried people enjoy the same fundamental right to privacy as married

76
Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1148-53 (1982). Between 1943 and 1974, oral and anal sex
was illegal in Texas regardless of the sexual orientation of the participants.
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Id. (noting the change in Texas Courts’ interpretation and enforcement of its anti-sodomy statute
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (guaranteeing
a married couple’s fundamental right to privacy)).
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Id. at 1150.
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Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2486-87 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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people.83 Following this logic, if Texas does not and presumably cannot ban
sodomy for married couples,84 then it is unconstitutional for the state to ban
sodomy for unmarried couples, whether heterosexual or homosexual.
Texas’s anti-sodomy statute is unconstitutional under either strand of
equal protection jurisprudence. The Supreme Court should have narrowly
based its opinion in Lawrence on the Equal Protection Clause to reverse
Lawrence’s conviction.85
3. Reinterpreting Bowers Under Equal Protection Would Reverse It
Narrowly
The majority opinion in Lawrence makes it clear that an integral part of
its decision included an evaluation of whether its prior decision in Bowers
should be overruled.86
Although the facts of Bowers are similar, they are significantly different
from those in Lawrence. The similarity begins and ends with the fact that
both cases involve statutes that ban sodomy.87 Unlike in Lawrence, the
Court in Bowers was presented with a Georgia statute that was facially
neutral in banning sodomy, regardless of the status of the participants.88 The
primary decision rendered in Bowers determined whether a state could
enact a facially neutral law to make sodomy illegal or “whether the Federal
Constitution confers a fundamental right89 upon homosexuals to engage in
sodomy . . . .”90 The Court further defined the issue before it adding that if
such a fundamental right were found to exist, then under the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, Georgia’s statute would
only be valid if it passed heightened scrutiny.91 The Court in Bowers opined
that based on the principle of judicial restraint the judiciary should be
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405 U.S. at 454.
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Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216-18 (Stevens, Brennan & Marshall, J.J., dissenting).
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Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor states her belief that
Equal Protection should be the basis of the decision in the opening paragraph of her concurring opinion.
Id.
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Id. at 2476.
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Id. at 2475; Bowers, 478 U.S. at 187.
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Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188.
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Id. at 189. The Court was specifically responding to a decision by the Eleventh Circuit that held
that Bowers did enjoy a “fundamental right” to homosexual sodomy. Id. It is arguable that seeing the
specific words in the opinion that created a new fundamental right under the Due Process Clause may
have caused the Court to make a less thorough determination of the equal protection issues inherent in
the case.
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extremely careful not to exceed its constitutional role to create new
fundamental rights under the Due Process Clauses.92
The majority opinion in Bowers held that homosexuals do not have a
fundamental right under the Constitution to engage in homosexual sodomy,
and the various states have retained the right to enact laws based on
fundamental moral beliefs held by the majority that are rationally related to
a legitimate state interest.93 Finally, the Court added that since the law is
“constantly based on notions of morality,”94 upholding morality is a
legitimate state interest to establish the constitutionality of Georgia’s
statute.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun stated that the majority
missed the key issue in Bowers, and somehow found itself on a tangent
deciding whether homosexual sodomy was a constitutionally guaranteed
fundamental right.95 Both Justice Blackmun’s and Justice Stevens’ dissents
indicate a strong belief that the real issue in Bowers was whether, under due
process jurisprudence, an individual’s fundamental right of privacy
transcends the state’s ability to criminalize private consensual sexual acts
between adults. While they concluded that the case should have been
decided on fundamental privacy rights, they also both added an important
consideration that Bowers could also have been decided differently under
equal protection jurisprudence.96 Justice Blackmun pointed out that while
its statute is facially neutral, Georgia is apparently willing “to enforce
against homosexuals a law it seems not to have any desire to enforce
against heterosexuals.”97 If, as Justice Blackmun suspected, the Georgia
statute were only applied selectively to a minority group of people, it would
violate the Equal Protection Clause.98 Justice Stevens included in his dissent
the similar belief that “selective application” of a facially neutral law is
unconstitutional.99
Given the rather apparent equal protection violation found in the
selective application of the Georgia statute in Bowers, it would seem that
the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to build a much stronger

92
Id. at 194 (adding that “[t]he Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it
deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design
of the Constitution”).
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Id. at 196.
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Id.
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Id. at 200 (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
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Id. at 214, 218.
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Id. at 201.
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consensus opinion to find the statute unconstitutional on a more limited
equal protection basis. The majority’s unfortunate tangent, to categorically
reject the Eleventh Circuit’s apparent creation of a new fundamental right
of homosexual sodomy, was arguably a tangent they felt compelled to
take.100 However, the majority could have found that there is no due process
extension guaranteeing a fundamental right to homosexual sodomy and still
held the statute unconstitutional as selectively applied by Georgia under the
Equal Protection Clause. This result would have been a much narrower
decision, and if the Lawrence decision would have followed this line of
jurisprudence and overruled Bowers under the Equal Protection Clause, all
the anticipated problems with the Court’s decision, predicted by Justice
Scalia in his dissent, could have been avoided.101 In its decision in
Lawrence, the majority missed an excellent opportunity to choose a narrow
path to reconsider and overrule Bowers on equal protection jurisprudence.
C. An Equal Protection Analysis Demonstrates Judicial Restraint and
Does Not Encroach on the Legislature, nor Undermine Countless State
Laws Based on the Moral Beliefs of the Majority
The principle of judicial restraint is an inherent part of the American
system of government. Within our government structure there are three
independent branches: executive, legislative, and the judiciary.102 The
Constitution delegates separate powers into the three branches, mandating
that each branch must respect the other’s domain.103 The respective roles of
the legislature and judiciary are clear; the legislature makes the laws, and
the judiciary interprets those laws and applies them to legal disputes.104
“The judiciary is not supposed to ‘make law,’ at least not in those areas in
which the legislature has acted.”105 Therefore, judicial restraint calls upon
the judiciary to self-regulate to ensure that on the one hand it interprets
legislation to enforce the will of the legislature, while at the same time
determining if the legislature’s will is in conformance with the

100

Id. at 191. When Georgia decided to not prosecute Michael Hardwick following his arrest on the
criminal charge of homosexual sodomy, he filed suit in Federal District Court to challenge the
constitutionality of the underlying statute, eventually leading to his appeal to the Eleventh Circuit and
subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court.
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See supra n. 65 and accompanying text.
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Marq. L. Rev. 435, 442 (1999).

Published by eCommons, 2003

103

Id.

104

Id.; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).

105

Fruehwald, supra n. 102, at 442.

462

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol.29:3

Constitution’s limits of the legislature’s power and authority.106
Judicial restraint, while limiting the power of the judiciary, is also
essential to ensuring its legitimacy.107 “The Court is most vulnerable and
comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional
law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the
Constitution.”108 Preserving the Court’s legitimacy is of paramount
importance because if the people were to ever lose faith in the Court, it
would undermine their fundamental belief in our constitutional ideals and
the rule of law.109
The principle of judicial restraint is so deeply rooted in our system of
government, with its separation of powers, that even if the Court believes
that the political branch has acted unwisely, it must follow the
constitutional presumption that “improvident decisions will eventually be
rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is
generally unwarranted . . . .”110
To uphold the principle of judicial restraint and to avoid claims of
political activism from intended or inadvertent encroachment on the roles of
the executive or legislative branches, the Court follows “two rules, to which
it has rigidly adhered, one, never to anticipate a question of constitutional
law in advance of the necessity of deciding it; the other never to formulate a
rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to
which it is to be applied.”111 As described earlier in this Note, the Court
should have decided Lawrence based on equal protection jurisprudence,
resulting in a far narrower enforcement of constitutional principles and
finding Texas’s anti-sodomy statute facially unconstitutional.112 However,
in deciding to leap over the narrower Equal Protection Clause interpretation
to embrace and utilize the broader Due Process Clause interpretation, the
majority anticipated a future question not currently before it and moved to
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Id.
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Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194.

108

Id.
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Casey, 505 U.S. at 868.
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Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1997). In Vance, the Court addressed an administrative policy
that required certain Foreign Service personnel to retire at age 60, while other civil servants were
permitted to retire later. Id. at 94-95. While the Court did not necessarily agree with the policy, it noted
that Congress was within its constitutional rights to establish a policy that was rational, and judicial
intervention was unwarranted because the Court must trust the democratic process to rectify even
improvident decisions. Id. at 109.
111
Liverpool, 113 U.S. at 39. See also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1047 (2000) (Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (stating “On questions whose resolution is committed at least in
large measure to another branch of the Federal Government, we [the Supreme Court] have construed our
own jurisdiction narrowly and exercised it cautiously.”); Kloppenberg, supra n. 41.
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Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
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proactively forestall a legislative act by the elected representatives of the
people to enact a facially neutral law.113 Also, in its opinion, the Court used
language that was broader than necessary when it wrote, “the fact that the
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice
as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
practice.”114 This choice of phrasing, borrowed in whole from an earlier
dissent by Justice Stevens in Bowers,115 has put into jeopardy every other
law enacted by the elected representatives of the people that is based on the
moral beliefs of the majority of the electorate.116 Justices Scalia and
Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, state in their dissenting opinion
that every state’s laws concerning sexually related criminal offenses are
called into question by the majority’s decision in what they describe as a
“massive disruption of the current social order.”117
More importantly, it is not the right or duty of the Court to proactively
forestall legislation on the one hand, nor unintentionally put into question
an entire body of law on the other, by painting with an unnecessarily broad
brush. In doing so, the Court violated its own internal rules of judicial
restraint, encroached on the role of the legislature, and opened itself up to
claims of political activism. These issues could have been avoided by
finding the Texas anti-sodomy statute unconstitutional under equal
protection jurisprudence.
IV. CONCLUSION
Judicial action to end discrimination against homosexuals as a class of
people is a just and righteous endeavor. This Note agrees that both
Georgia’s and Texas’s anti-sodomy statutes are unconstitutional. However,
the correct judicial analysis, in finding them unconstitutional, should have
been under the Equal Protection Clause.
Using equal protection jurisprudence as its basis, the Court could have
found that the Texas anti-sodomy statute was facially unconstitutional as
written, and also unconstitutional as applied. Since it permitted
heterosexual sodomy and prohibited same-sex sodomy, reasonable minds
could not differ that it was written with an animus against homosexuals as a
class. Also, there is no viable and legitimate state interest adequate to
113

Id.

114

Id. at 2483.
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Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
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Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2490 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 2490, 2491; see supra n. 64 and accompanying text (listing sexually related criminal
offenses put into question by the majority opinion).
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permit the criminalization of conduct, inherent to the essence of being a
homosexual that does not criminalize it for heterosexuals. On the other
hand, Georgia’s facially neutral statute in Bowers could have been found
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, as Georgia only applied
it against homosexual couples. Bowers should have been reinterpreted and
overruled on that basis.
If the Supreme Court’s majority followed the equal protection path, it
would have properly decided Lawrence; overruled and properly decided
Bowers; maintained its principles of stare decisis and judicial restraint;
reinforced the constitutional role of the legislature; and avoided
unnecessary legal challenges to a plethora of state laws that are based on
the moral beliefs of the majority of the citizenry, as enacted by their
representatives. The Supreme Court should have adopted Justice
O’Connor’s opinion as the majority opinion.
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